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Abstract: 
Although intellectual property law is a distinctively Western, modern, and 
relatively young body of law, it has spread all over the world, now 
encompassing all but a very few outsiders such as Afghanistan, Somalia, and 
Vanuatu. This article presents three legal transfers that contributed to this 
development: first, from real property in land and movables to intellectual 
property in the late 18th century in Western Europe; second, from Western 
Europe, in particular from the United Kingdom and France to the rest of the 
world during the colonial era in the 19th and early 20th century; third, from the 
protection of new knowledge to the protection of traditional knowledge, held by 
indigenous communities in developing countries, on 5 August 1963. This story 
illuminates how legal transfers in a broad sense – including, but not limited to 
legal transplants - drive the evolution of law. 
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I. Introduction 
 
According to Alan Watson »at most times, in most places, borrowing from a 
different jurisdiction has been the principal way in which the law has developed. 
This is as true today when one state in the U.S.A. will take over what has been 
worked out in another, or when England follows New Zealand, or Scotland, 
Sweden or France, as in the centuries of the reception of Roman law and 
earlier.« (Watson 2001: 98).  
 
In Watson’s view, such legal transplants should be at the center of comparative 
law (Watson 2001: 141). Watson’s writings triggered an intense debate (Ewald 
1995; Deipenbrock 2008: 343-361). Are legal transplants possible,
1 or are they 
only »a meaningless form of words« because a rule receives its meanings from 
the legal culture in which it is embedded (Legrand 2001: 55)? Or do 
»transplantations« (Kahn-Freund 1974: 1), »irritants« (Teubner 1998: 11) or 
»transfers« (Frankenberg 2010: 563-579) exhibit certain effects, and the 
question to be answered is, which effects? Irrespective of their divergent views 
on legal transplants, all these scholars take a comparative perspective. For 
them, »transfer« means a rule or legal concept that moves across borders of 
nation states or regions. They think in terms of time and space. 
 
The main point of this article is that there are other types of legal transfers that 
also play a role in the evolution of law. These borrowings and adaptations do 
not concern spatial shifts, but the application of one legal rule, concept, or 
principle to another set of facts. These kinds of analogies happen within one 
jurisdiction or within one region sharing similar societal and legal ground.  
 
Such a transfer lies at the heart of the following story: the global spread of 
intellectual property (IP) rights. Copyrights in works of art and patents in 
technical inventions are nowadays known all over the world, excluding only very 
few outsiders such as Afghanistan, Somalia, and Vanuatu (Peukert: Colonial 
Legacy, forthcoming). This is an amazing fact, considering that this distinctively 
                                                 
1 For an optimistic view, see Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, p. 378 et seq. 3 
 
modern, market-based regulation of innovative and creative behavior is only 
some 300 years old.  
 
No doubt, there are many non-legal reasons for this »successful« diffusion. In 
particular, IP rights are an attractive tool to leverage economic and political 
power. However, there are also specifically legal reasons and preconditions for 
this legal development, among them legal transfers. The transfers I will describe 
may not be the most important factors in the global spread of IP, but they 
contributed to the enormous rise of this field of law by providing legal tools to 
effectively articulate, but at the same time also obscure, the desired regulatory 
result. 
 
I will describe three transfers in a broad sense: First, from real property in land 
and movables to intellectual property in the late 18
th century in Western Europe. 
Second, from Western Europe, in particular from the UK and France, to the rest 
of the world during the colonial age in the late 19
th and early 20
th century. Third, 
from the protection of new knowledge to the protection of traditional knowledge, 
held by indigenous communities in developing countries, when colonialism drew 
to a close in the 1960s, or, to be more precise, on 5 August 1963. 
 
II. Three transfers in the history of IP law 
 
Obviously, only the second part of this story concerns legal transplants pursuant 
to comparative lawyers such as Watson or Legrand. Not so our first transfer – 
the application of the idea of ownership in tangibles, like this desk or land, to 
intangibles, such as inventions and works of art.  
 
1. From property rights in tangibles to intellectual property rights 
 
The most prominent copyright and patent acts in history were enacted in the 
course of revolutions heralding the modern age: the 1709 English Statute of 
Anne, considered the world’s first copyright act, and more clearly even the US 
and French copyright and patent acts of the early 1790s. Seen from this 
perspective, IP legislation appears to be a legal innovation. Clearly defined 4 
 
statutory rights of authors and inventors replaced the system of feudal 
privileges. This move from privilege to property signals a new Grundnorm in the 
use of knowledge: Instead of keeping innovation and creativity under control for 
the sake of mercantilism and censorship, the new laws aimed at encouraging 
learning and the progress of science and useful arts. Since then, innovation and 
creativity have been considered worthy of protection in and of themselves. This 
change was fundamental indeed. In particular, the justification of any private 
property had to be detached from god’s and the sovereign’s will and grounded 
in the individual. This was accomplished most forcefully by Locke’s labor theory 
of ownership (Hesse 2002: 26). 
 
Although this natural law theory, as well as the principles of first appropriation or 
possession, had been developed for the use of land, they proved to be a very 
good fit for inventions and creative products of the mind. Who if not the original 
author or inventor should be the proprietor of her work of art, her technical 
invention? Thus, rights in intellectual property could be justified by simply 
applying the already existing property theories (Kohler 1880: 98-99; Peukert 
2008: 734 et seq.). From a legal doctrinal point of view, they were mere 
adaptations, not original innovations (Sacco 1991: 343, 398 »Of all the legal 
changes that occur, perhaps one in a thousand is an original innovation.«).
2  
 
Nevertheless, this extension of the idea of private ownership was not an easy or 
quickly accomplished move. The major obstacle for this transfer concerned the 
subject matter of this new type of ownership. What exactly is it that an author or 
inventor owns? 
 
In that respect, Roman law did not provide an answer. Dominium or proprietas 
covered only corporeal property, defined in the Corpus Iuris as by its nature 
tangible, for instance land, a slave, gold, and other things. »Res incorporales«, 
that which cannot be touched, meant rights, such as the right of inheritance, or 
obligations.
3  Roman law had not developed a concept of »intangibles« or 
intellectual property in the sense of works of art or inventions.  
                                                 
2 On English patent law: Phillips, The English Patent, p. 41. 
3 See Inst. 2, 1, 33; 2,2; Peukert, Gemeinfreiheit, p. 43-44. 5 
 
 
Thus, before the transfer from real property to intellectual property could be 
accomplished, an object of ownership had to be constructed first. Here, on this 
semantic, non-legal level, the decisive »innovation« took place.  
 
Feudal privileges had always regulated commercial activities. They referred to 
the printing of books
4 or the working or making of new manufacture.
5 The goods 
at stake were tangibles: books, machines, and other products.  
 
This activity-centered approach was still prevalent in England and the U.S. 
throughout 18
th century. On the one hand, the 1709 Statute of Anne, considered 
the world’s first copyright act, already called the »author« of a book a 
»proprietor«. On the other hand, the statute granted the author the »sole right 
and liberty« of »printing… Books« – an activity relating to a tangible.
6 Thus the 
(still later) terminology of copy-rights:
7  rights in copies, rights to copy. The 
concept of a »work« as a distinct entity, detached from its incorporation in a 
book, was still absent.
8 
                                                 
4 See, e.g., French Royal letters patent, Paris (1701), Primary Sources on Copyright (1450-
1900), eds L. Bently & M. Kretschmer, www.copyrighthistory.org, Art. I (»That no Bookseller, 
Printer or other person may cause to be printed or reprinted anywhere in the Kingdom any 
Book, without having previously obtained permission to do so in Letters bearing the great 
Seal.«). 
5 See Statute of Monopolies, Westminster (1624), Primary Sources on Copyright (1450-1900), 
eds L. Bently & M. Kretschmer, www.copyrighthistory.org (»the sole working or makinge of any 
manner of new manufacture«, not extending to »letters Patentes or Grauntes of priviledge 
heretofore made or hereafter to be made of for or concerning printing, Nor to any Comission 
graunte or letters pattentes heretofore made or hereafter to be made of for or concerneing the 
digging makeing or Compounding of salt peter or gunpowder«). 
6 Statute of Anne, London (1710), Primary Sources on Copyright (1450-1900), eds L. Bently & 
M. Kretschmer, www.copyrighthistory.org; Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective, p. 4.  
7 The term »copyright« was used for the fist time in British legislation in the Copyright Act of 
1801, 41 Geo.III, c.107, Primary Sources on Copyright (1450-1900), eds L. Bently & M. 
Kretschmer, www.copyrighthistory.org. 
8 The same is true for Germany, where privileges were related to the right to reprint and to the 
sale of reprinted books (for example Saxonian Statute, Dresden (1773), Primary Sources on 
Copyright (1450-1900), eds L. Bently & M. Kretschmer, www.copyrighthistory.org; see also 
Prussian Statute Book (Allgemeines Landrecht für die Preussischen Staaten) (1794), Primary 
Sources on Copyright (1450-1900), eds L. Bently & M. Kretschmer, www.copyrighthistory.org, 
Paragraph 996: »Das Verlagsrecht besteht in der Befugnis, eine Schrift durch den Druck zu 
vervielfältigen, und sie auf Messen, unter die Buchhändler und sonst, ausschließend 
abzusetzen.  Paragraph 997: Nicht bloß Bücher, sondern auch Landkarten, Kupferstiche, 
topographische Zeichnungen, und musikalische Kompositionen, sind ein Gegenstand des 
Verlagsrechtes.«), and where the discussion about what we now call »Urheberrecht« was about 
the lawfulness of reprinting books (»Büchernachdruck«); see, e.g. Pütter, Der Büchernachdruck 
nach ächten Grundsätzen des Rechts geprüft.  The first mention of the term »geistiges 6 
 
 
This objectification only occurred during the second half of the 18
th century. At 
that time, the romantic movement in literature and art established the »author« 
as the central figure of cultural production and natural owner of her concrete 
work product (Woodmansee 1984: 425-448; Jaszi 1991: 455). Still this was not 
enough. Ownership in this work product would result only in exclusive rights in 
the manuscript and possibly in a prohibition of identical copies. But how was 
one to deal with alterations of a text? Did these modifications also encroach 
upon the copy-right? Since these adaptations were created by third parties, the 
original author could not claim ownership on the basis of her labor (John Locke) 
or her speech to the public (Kant 1785). 
 
Instead, she had to claim that she owns »the« work in the sense of a free-
standing abstraction that embraces more than the literal expression embodied 
in the corresponding manuscript (Jaszi 1991: 455, 473 et seq.).
9 That artifact 
has to have an existence and scope of protection of its own. It is the work that 
requires Werktreue and Texttreue. The work became a structurally integrated 
whole that is only symbolically represented in books and scores and valued 
solely according to autonomous criteria of the fine arts. The word »work« is a 
typical  Kollektivsingular  of the late 18
th  century describing both a process 
(working an invention, producing a creative work) and a result (the original 
work) on a high level of abstraction, allowing modern societies and capitalist 
markets to operate (Koselleck 2010). Thus, romantic aesthetics together with 
shifts in cultural production brought about not only the one and only true owner 
(that is, the author), but also the distinct object that any clearly defined property 
right and market order requires.
10  
 
The French revolutionary acts on patents and authors rights of 1791 and 1793 
were the first to adopt this concept. They had to avoid any echoing of former 
royal privileges. Therefore, they replaced monopoly rights in commercial 
                                                                                                                                               
Eigentum« (intellectual property) dates back to 1784; see Bosse, Autorschaft ist 
Werkherrschaft. 
9Also, on British and US 19
th century case law on the question of copyright infringement by 
alterations to the original text or picture: Barron, Commodification and Cultural Form, p. 58, 70. 
10 For musical works, see Goehr, The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works, p. 120 et seq. 7 
 
activities with individual property rights. Inventors and artists were both called 
»auteur«. They were granted a property right (propriété) in their invention or 
work.
11 Jean Le Chapelier, a deputy of the National Assembly, justified this new 
type of propriété proclaiming that »The most sacred, the most legitimate, the 
most unassailable, and the most personal of all properties, is the work, the fruit 
of the mind of a writer«.
12  
 
From revolutionary France, this variation of classical property law slowly 
traveled to other European countries. The Badisches Allgemeines Landrecht of 
1809, a modified »Code Napoleon«, introduced this idea to Germany –  an 
imposed legal transplant.
13  It was only in an 1837 Directive for reciprocal 
copyright protection within the German Confederation that the protection related 
to »works of art«.
14 British copyright law in the first half of the 19
th century also 
still operated on the basis of granting the sole and exclusive liberty of printing 
books,
15 »representing … dramatic entertainment«
16 or »otherwise multiplying 
copies of any subject to which said word is herein applied«.
17 It adopted the 
notion of an abstract »work of art« only in 1851 via the Anglo-French Copyright 
Treaty.
18  With the »Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property/propriété industrielle« of 1883
19  and the »Berne Convention for the 
                                                 
11  See Art. 1 French Literary and Artistic Property Act, Paris (1793), Primary Sources on 
Copyright (1450-1900), eds L. Bently & M. Kretschmer, www.copyrighthistory.org (»Les auteurs 
d'écrits en tout genre, les compositeurs de musique, les peintres et dessinateurs qui feront 
graver des tableaux et dessins, jouiront, durant leur vie entière du droit exclusif de vendre, faire 
vendre, distribuer leurs ouvrages dans le territoire de la République, et d'en céder la propriété 
en tout ou en partie.«), Art. 1 French Patent Act 1791, reprinted in Kurz, Weltgeschichte des 
Erfindungsschutzes, 2000, p. 243-5. 
12 Le Chapelier's report, Paris (1791), Primary Sources on Copyright (1450-1900), eds L. Bently 
& M. Kretschmer, www.copyrighthistory.org. 
13 See Art. 577d Baden Civil Code, Karlsruhe (1809), Primary Sources on Copyright (1450-
1900), eds L. Bently & M. Kretschmer, www.copyrighthistory.org (»Vom Schrift-Eigenthum«). 
14  See Art. 1 Directive for reciprocal copyright protection within  the German Confederation, 
Berlin (1837), Primary Sources on Copyright (1450-1900), eds L. Bently & M. Kretschmer, 
www.copyrighthistory.org; Bosse (supra note), at 111, 113. 
15 Copyright Act, London (1814), Primary Sources on Copyright (1450-1900), eds L. Bently & M. 
Kretschmer, www.copyrighthistory.org. 
16 Dramatic Literary Property Act, London (1833), Primary Sources on Copyright (1450-1900), 
eds L. Bently & M. Kretschmer, www.copyrighthistory.org. 
17 International Copyright Act, London (1844), Primary Sources on Copyright (1450-1900), eds 
L. Bently & M. Kretschmer, www.copyrighthistory.org. 
18 Anglo-French Copyright Treaty, London (1851), Primary Sources on Copyright (1450-1900), 
eds L. Bently & M. Kretschmer, www.copyrighthistory.org (»desirous of extending in each 
country the enjoyment of copyright to works of literature and of the fine arts which may be first 
published in the other…«). 
19 http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/, 30.10.2012. 8 
 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works« of 1886,
20  the commodification of 
technical inventions, designs, trademarks, and works of art had become the 
internationally dominant paradigm.  
 
As a consequence of our first transfer, intellectual property is subject to the 
same principles that apply to real property. All property rights are guaranteed by 
the one fundamental right to property.
21 They all grant the owner a transferable 
exclusive right to use the good and to exclude others from it. Any limitation of 
these rights requires justification. Finally, the normative arguments in favor of IP 
rights are the same as those for classical property rights: Thou shalt not steal – 
be it a car or a digital file. Otherwise, self-determination in economic matters, 
freedom in general, and efficiency will be lost (Demsetz 1967: 347-359).
22  
 
Nevertheless, until this very day, legal doctrine in France and Germany 
struggles with the question whether author’s rights and industrial property rights 
are properly qualified as »propriété« (Bouchet-le Mappian 2009), or »Eigentum« 
(Jänich 2002). Different from private property in land and movables, IP rights 
are also a highly contentious political issue. These ongoing debates are at least 
in part due to a blind spot created by our first legal transfer. The extension of 
property theory obscures the fundamental differences between tangibles on the 
one hand and intangibles on the other. To his already cited, famous praise of 
intellectual property as the most sacred type of property, Le Chapelier added: 
»Yet it is a property of a totally  different kind than other properties.« 
Unfortunately, this indeed important qualification of the property analogy did not 
receive attention. I will come back to this blind spot in my conclusions.  
 
2. From Western Europe to the rest of the world 
 
By the end of the 19
th century, inventions and works of art had become tradable 
commodities. The problem was, though, that the respective IP rights were 
limited to the territory of the state granting them: German patents or copyrights 
                                                 
20 http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/, 30.10.2012. 
21 See Art. 17 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. 
22 For a critique, see Peukert, Güterzuordnung, p. 732 et seq. 9 
 
were valid only in Germany, not in France, and vice versa. Publishers, 
producers of technology, and not least colonial empires, however, wanted to 
also control non-European markets. As a consequence, IP law was 
transplanted to the rest of the world – this time indeed in the sense of Watson 
and Legrande.  
 
Many writings about the current global IP system suggest that the territorial 
diffusion of this body of law effectively happened only in the mid 1990s via the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), 
which forms part of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO.
23  It is 
certainly true that the Washington Consensus managed to justify and push for a 
new, global »gold standard« of IP protection, which is now binding for 153 WTO 
members. However, the globalization of IP occurred much earlier, namely 
during the colonial era. It was the imperial expansion of European influence that 
was primarily responsible for the inclusion of the rest of the world in the IP 
system as we know it today (Okediji 2003: 315-385; Rahmatian 2009: 40-74). 
 
There were two possibilities of implementing IP protection in the colonies 
(Peukert: Colonial Legacy, forthcoming). One was to simply codify in national 
law that the British or French legislation applied to these territories. From the 
early 19
th  century onwards, the British introduced copyright law in all of the 
colonies and territories under their rule, mandates included (Bently 2011: 161, 
171-81). In 1857, France formally extended its revolutionary act on author’s 
rights of 1793 to its colonies. Whereas patent law was generally less widely and 
less aggressively dispersed via empire, by 1864, already seventeen British 
colonies had adopted patent laws, among them India and New Zealand (Bently 
2011: 161, 171-81). 
 
The other route of IP law to the colonies led via international treaties. All 
international IP treaties, be it the 19
th century Berne and Paris Conventions, the 
UNESCO Universal Copyright Convention of 1952, or even the UNESCO 1961 
Rome Convention on the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms 
                                                 
23 http://www.wto.int/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_01_e.htm, 30.10.2012. See, for example, 
Shi, Globalization and Indigenization, p. 455. 10 
 
and Broadcasting Organizations, include provisions on the applicability of the 
respective treaty to »Certain Territories«.
24  These provisions, which can be 
traced back to a proposal of the British delegation to the original Berne 
Convention, state that »any country may declare in its instrument of ratification 
or accession … that this Convention shall be applicable to all or part of those 
territories … for the external relations of which it is responsible«. All colonial 
powers, in particular France and the United Kingdom, but also Spain, the 
Netherlands, Japan, and not least Germany, made extensive use of this rule 
(Peukert: Colonial Legacy, forthcoming). 
 
The aim of these colonial transplants was to protect business interests in the 
metropolitan areas, in particular those of London or Paris book publishers who 
wanted to control the colonial markets and were in fear of the global diffusion of 
communication technologies (Drahos/Braithwaite 2002: 74). In contrast, self-
governing British dominions like Australia and Canada and former colonies like 
the U.S. adopted British legislation with modifications only (Peukert: Colonial 
Legacy, forthcoming). These were more or less voluntary, cost-saving 
borrowings, reacting to at least some local regulatory demand, which could 
already rely on the powerful »intellectual property« narrative.
25 Whereas these 
latter borrowings quickly gained significance  in the recipient countries, the 
imposed imperial transfers, in particular to African colonies, only addressed the 
colonial elites controlling book printing and other public communication like 
newspapers and radio.
26 Oral literature and other creativity not fixed in tangible 
media, however, did not qualify for international copyright protection during the 
colonial period (Peukert: Colonial Legacy, forthcoming). Exactly this mode of 
                                                 
24  See Art. 31 Berne Convention; Art. 24 Paris Convention; Art. XIII of the 1952 UNESCO 
Universal Copyright Convention (UCC, http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=15241&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html, 30.10.2012); Art. 27 of the 
1961 International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and 
Broadcasting Organizations (http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/rome/trtdocs_wo024.html, 
30.10.2012). 
25 For the British Empire: Bently, The ‘extraordinary multiplicity’ of intellectual property laws, p. 
161, 171-81; for U.S. copyright: Bracha, The Adventures of the Statute of Anne, p. 1427; for 
Palestine, see Birnhack, Hebrew authors and English copyright law in Mandate Palestine, p. 
201-240. 
26  On these differences see generally  Rheinstein/v. Borries/Niethammer, Einführung in die 
Rechtsvergleichung, p. 124 et seq. (reception, transplant, oktroy); Friedman, Borders, p. 65; 
Miller, A Typology of Legal Transplants, p. 839; Berkowitz/Pistor/Richard, The Transplant Effect, 
p. 163; see also Watson, Society and Legal Change, p. 99 et seq. 11 
 
creativity, however, was prevalent in many colonies, particularly in Africa. It only 
entered the global copyright stage in the 1960s under the topic of »folklore«.
27  
 
Nevertheless, the imperial IP dictate had long-term consequences. First, the 
transplantation of IP models from Western Europe to the rest of the world 
established a one-size-fits-all model for the regulation of innovation and 
creativity. This approach neglects the fundamentally different socio-economic 
circumstances in industrialized and colonized, later developing countries – 
again a blind spot created by a legal transfer (Umahi 2011). Second, at the time 
of independence, most of the then developing countries already formed part of 
the global IP system. It was not necessary to persuade them to accede to the 
international IP unions in the first place. They were already members of the 
club. They only had to be prevented from leaving. This was accomplished in 
part by our third and final legal transfer: from the protection of new inventions, 
designs, and original works of art to the protection of traditional knowledge.  
 
3. From the protection of innovation to the protection of traditional knowledge 
 
With the independence of the former colonies, the United International Bureaux 
for the Protection of Intellectual Property (French acronym BIRPI) in charge of 
administering the Berne and Paris Unions – the predecessor of WIPO – feared 
that the international IP system might implode. As the »guardian« of the Berne 
Union, BIRPI was concerned about »a constant and big geographical shrinking, 
to the prejudice of the interests of authors« (Masouyé 1962: 84, 86).
28 The head 
of the copyright division of BIRPI, Claude Masouyé, identified an »exotic time« 
and wondered »whether politically, economically, socially, it is good or evil« that 
one »must record the contemporary phenomenon of the decolonization« 
(Masouyé 1962: 84, 144). 
 
The most important legal question arising with the wave of independence was 
whether the new states were still bound by the IP treaties. BIRPI argued that 
                                                 
27 See infra, II.3. 
28  Critical: Lazar, Developing countries and authors’ rights, p. 17-28 (»neo-colonialism«); 
Drahos/Braithwaite,  Information Feudalism, p. 75-84; Okediji, The international relations of 
intellectual property, p. 323-34.  12 
 
this was the case absent an express declaration to the contrary (Ronga 1956: 
21-6). However, even the diehards of the colonial IP system had to accept that 
the then developing countries were at least free to exit. One could assume that 
the reception of a transplanted foreign law ends when the power of the imposed 
legal system ceases (Sacco 1991: 398). 
 
Not so with regard to IP law. In the end, only four newly independent countries 
denounced membership in the Berne Copyright Union, namely Indonesia in 
1960, Syria in 1962, Upper Volta in 1969, and Mauritius in 1971 
(Ricketson/Ginsburg 2006: para. 17.59). Most African least-developed countries 
during the 1960s formally acceded or simply declared – following a suggestion 
of the International IP Bureau at Geneva – the uninterrupted continuity of their 
colonial obligations under the Berne and Paris conventions (Ricketson/Ginsburg 
2006: para. 17.60). In addition, two regional patent offices were established for 
the West African, francophone countries and the East African, mostly 
anglophone countries in 1962 and 1976, respectively. These patent offices 
grant unified patents and other industrial property rights for a total of 33 
countries. The treaties establishing this unified system implement a highly 
protectionist IP agenda (Deere 2009: 35 et seq.). 
 
What we have before us are post-colonial structures with the aim of stabilizing 
the status quo ante. The purpose of the two African regional patent offices was 
to replace the French and British IP institutions with as little effect on the 
availability of IP protection as possible (Deere 2009: 242, 249). In March 1960, 
BIRPI sent letters to the soon-to-be independent colonies explaining that 
continuity must normally be assured (Masouyé 1962: 84, 122). Ever since the 
early 1960s, BIRPI and later WIPO in collaboration with European copyright 
societies, patent offices, and rights holders’ organizations have organized 
seminars in the former colonies to advise in IP matters, submitting model drafts 
for »appropriate IP legislation« (Johnson 1970: 91, 94-103). This seemingly 
technical assistance created a local IP elite having a strong individual interest to 
push a pro-IP agenda irrespective of the general effects of this policy for a 
developing country (Kunz-Hallstein 1982: 689, 697 (a »whole new generation of 13 
 
Third World copyright experts shares the view that copyright is favourable to 
development«)). 
 
In spite of these efforts, the 1967 diplomatic conference on a revision of the 
Berne copyright convention became a highly politicized event that nearly blew 
up the small IP world. The newly independent countries did not threaten to 
leave, but they claimed special treatment. What they eventually got was a 
protocol setting out very limited, practically irrelevant compulsory licenses in 
favor of their educational sector.
29  
 
But even after this frustrating experience, no former colony decided to leave. 
The reasons for this are manifold (Peukert: Colonial Legacy, forthcoming). First, 
IP policy was not high on the political agenda of the newly independent states. 
These issues did not justify international turmoil. Moreover, both the Western 
and the Soviet Bloc formed part of one IP community. It therefore did not matter 
with which party of the cold war a new state sided (Lazar 1971: 7). Second, the 
system exhibits a powerful network effect. If the newly independent countries 
wanted protection for their nationals in the former metropolitan markets, they 
had to become part of the Union and grant reciprocal protection to Western 
right-holders on their territory.
30 Last but not least, only few observers stressed 
the importance of access to knowledge for development. The IP narrative, 
according to which a high level of protection is good, but more protection is 
better, was prevalent, even among participants from the developing countries. 
Critical thinking was blurred by the claim that the rich creativity in former 
colonies deserved the same legal protection as works originating in the Global 
North (N’Diaye 1975: 59, 84), a claim that neglects the fundamentally different 
modes of creativity operating in Western cultural markets and e.g. sub-Saharan 
oral literature and music (Gana 1995: 109, 125-37). 
 
                                                 
29 See Art. 21 and Appendix to the Berne Convention; Art. V
bis to V
quater UCC; Peukert, Colonial 
Legacy, with further references. 
30 See Art. 5 Berne Convention; Art. 2 Paris Convention; Ntahokaja, Réunion africaine d’étude 
sur le droit d’auteur, 250, 251. 14 
 
A further issue was that of protecting »folklore«, nowadays termed »traditional 
cultural expressions«, or more broadly »traditional knowledge«.
31  It can be 
traced back to the very first copyright seminar in post-colonial Africa. Upon a 
recommendation of the U.S., UNESCO had in 1960 agreed to support a 
copyright assistance program for newly independent countries.
32 On the basis 
of this UNESCO mandate, copyright arrived at post-colonial Africa on 5 August 
1963, when 30 African and 15 high-profile participants from Europe and the 
U.S. gathered for the first »African seminar on copyright« in Brazzaville, capital 
of the Congolese Republic, which had gained independence  from France in 
1960.
33 
 
The seminar started with an introduction to the global copyright system by 
Eugen Ulmer, at that time professor of law in Munich and a central figure of the 
international copyright debates in the 1960s. Ulmer opened his lecture with the 
two essential ideas of the »droit d’auteur«: »la propriété immatérielle« (see our 
first transfer) and encouraging creative activities. He then argued that his topic 
is an important issue for the newly independent African states. In particular, he 
stressed the necessity to protect national music and »folklore«. Ulmer’s 
suggestion was quickly adopted by the local participants. Five days later, the 
participants of the seminar unanimously recommended that special laws should 
be adopted to protect the cultural heritage of the African nations from being 
exploited without consent of the communities »owning« them (Ntahokaja 1963: 
259). 
 
Ulmer’s proposal was a brilliant maneuver. At the 1960 General Conference of 
UNESCO, African countries had indeed emphasized the need to rediscover and 
preserve African heritage and culture. However, they did not claim a new kind of 
legal protection for this purpose (Johnson 1970: 96.). Ulmer succeeded in 
linking the desire to preserve African culture with notions of protection and 
copyright. On the one hand, Ulmer advertised Western author’s rights as a tool 
                                                 
31 http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/, 30.10.2012. 
32 UNESCO, Die Beschlüsse der 11. Generalkonferenz über das Programm der UNESCO in 
den Jahren 1961 und 1962. 
33 See, also on the following details, the report of Ntahokaja, Réunion africaine d’étude sur le 
droit d’auteur, p. 250, 251. 15 
 
to foster progress. On the other hand, he extended the concept of copyright to 
»folklore«. He thereby exemplified the responsiveness of the international 
copyright system. In addition, he set the framework for further discussions, 
which could only be concerned with »protection«, be it of »original works« or 
»folklore«. In essence, Ulmer offered a deal: If you, developing countries, join 
the global copyright club and protect our cultural products, we will protect your 
»folklore«. 
 
The question of how to properly protect TK has been discussed ever since. 
There are many model laws and more and more national acts on the protection 
of traditional knowledge, but no international treaty requiring protection in the 
industrialized countries themselves, where exploitation of TK does in fact take 
place (Sherkin 2001: 43). In that respect, Ulmer’s suggestion did not produce 
the promised result. 
 
In another respect, it did. The prospect of a special regime protecting TK was 
very attractive. African delegates considered the protection of »folklore« a 
matter of great urgency and importance (Kunz-Hallstein 1982: 701-3). 
Developing countries in South America and Asia joined this view.
34 The mere 
fact that the protection of TK was being discussed had integrative effects. It kept 
the former colonies –  or better to say their expert representatives –  at the 
negotiation table. At home, these representatives could argue that the Western 
IP community cared  about the concerns of indigenous communities in 
developing countries. 
 
As a result of all these efforts, only five out of the 48 least-developed countries 
did not already belong to a regional or international IP system when the TRIPS 
agreement entered into force in 1995. In Africa, this concerned the two 
Portuguese colonies Mozambique and Angola and the East-African French 
colony Djibouti, which could apparently not be integrated in the West-African 
francophone bloc (Peukert: Colonial Legacy, forthcoming).
35 The colonial legacy 
of the global IP system also delivers an explanation for the amazing fact that 
                                                 
34 Folklore Committee, Report, Copyright 1967, p. 52. 
35 The two further countries are Burma and Salomon Islands. 16 
 
today all least-developed countries do protect copyrights, patents and many 
other IP rights, although they are under no obligation to do so under WTO law: 
The extended transition period for LDCs to apply the bulk of TRIPS obligations 
will not end until 2013, and it might well be further extended.
36  
From this perspective, the TRIPS Agreement is only an episode in a whole 
series of steps to integrate developing countries into the global IP system. The 
same holds true for the ongoing debate about the protection of traditional 
knowledge. One could even ask whether this discourse is only a fig leaf 
obscuring the post-colonial transfer of IP laws.  
 
III. Conclusions 
 
1. Legal transplants and legal analogies 
 
I have described three legal transfers which contributed to the spread and 
stabilization of the global IP system. These three incidents can be classified into 
two categories. 
 
The first category concerns legal transplants in the sense of Watson, Legrande, 
and others. In that respect, our story suggests drawing a distinction between the 
diffusion of hard rules, in our case statutorily defined property rights, and the 
transfer of legal principles. Constitutions or general principles like »Treu und 
Glauben« will be re-contextualized in their new environment (Teubner 1998). 
Exclusive property rights leave less room for reinterpretation and »bricolage«. 
Instead, they operate very much the same way in different economic and social 
environments, if only someone claims this exclusive protection. For example, 
the complaints about copyright piracy as articulated by India’s Bollywood and 
Nigeria’s Nollywood film producers very much resemble the complaints 
articulated by Hollywood (Jedlowski, forthcoming). 
                                                 
36 See Art. 66(1) TRIPS and No. 1 Decision of the Council for TRIPS of 29 November 2005, 
Extension of the Transition Period Under Article 66.1 for Least-Developed Country Members, 
WTO Document IP/C/40; Ministerial Conference, Decision of 17 December 2011, WTO 
Document WT/L/845 (»We invite the TRIPS Council to give full consideration to a duly 
motivated request from Least-Developed Country Members for an extension of their transition 
period under Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement, and report thereon to the WTO Ninth 
Ministerial Conference.«). 17 
 
 
The second category of legal transfers concerns the application of a legal 
principle to another set of facts. At least in the field of IP law, such extended 
employment of a legal concept forms the most important mechanism to 
generate legal variants. The transfer of the property idea from tangibles to 
intangibles was a slow, endogenous evolution of Western private law, reacting 
to social change. The transfer of the property idea from innovation to traditional 
knowledge, instead, was an exogenous, politically motivated suggestion, which 
did not respond to nor try to induce social change.
37  
 
This second category bears some resemblance to an analogy drawn by a court. 
However, courts extend the application of specific rules  to similar cases.  In 
doing so, they normally stress that the established rule applies »mutatis 
mutandis« in different circumstances, thereby limiting the impact of this 
variation. In contrast to this, the transfers we have studied concern general legal 
principles: property and ownership. On their normative basis, »new« legal 
principles like that of intellectual property are developed. Once accepted, these 
variations exhibit their own normative dynamic. They do not disclose the 
transfer and the problematic blind spots that come with it.  
 
2.  Legal transfers conceal differences 
 
This observation leads to my second conclusion: Every legal transfer, be it 
across borders or with regard to legal concepts, tends to conceal differences.  
 
The application of legal principles developed for real property to intellectual 
property neglects the categorical differences between the two subject matters. 
Land and movables are rivalrous and exclusive goods. A meadow can be used 
only by a limited number of farmers. Without individual or communal property 
rights, there is a risk of a tragedy of the commons: the meadow will be overused 
and eventually destroyed (Hardin 1968: 1243-1248). Inventions and works of 
art, instead, are a non-rivalrous, non-exclusive resource. You cannot overuse 
                                                 
37 On these differences, see Sacco, Legal Formants, p. 390 et seq. 18 
 
and destroy »a« musical composition or »an« invention. Explicit knowledge is 
not a scarce resource. The more it is distributed and used – for example via the 
internet – the more positive externalities it generates. This is why knowledge in 
the public domain – think of Bach’s Goldberg Variations – is efficiently used and 
preserved. This is why »information wants to be free«, but not so land and 
movables (Lemley 2005: 1031-1076; Peukert 2012: 51 et seq.). 
 
In order to make these differences visible again, it is necessary to deconstruct 
the first transfer I have described: the idealistic notion that »a« work of art is a 
commodity just as a desk or a hard copy of a book is. Correct is instead the 
older notion of copy-rights: IP rights regulate activities, for example the copying 
of texts, the use of computers, and the realization of personal creativity. IP 
rights do not allocate goods, but possibilities for action. This is why they have to 
be limited for the sake of individual freedom (Peukert 2012: 56 et seq.). 
 
The second transfer – the transplantation of IP law from Western Europe to the 
rest of the world – disregards the fact that knowledge exporters and importers 
have fundamentally different needs.
38 Developing countries require, first of all, 
easy access to knowledge in order to acquire innovative capacity, which again 
is essential for development. Producers and exporters of knowledge and 
knowledge-intense goods, on the other hand, strive to protect their competitive 
advantage to the maximum extent possible. Indeed, none of the now developed 
countries applied a highly protectionist, effective IP system at the time of its 
economic and technological take-off (Chang 2001). The U.S. is generally 
considered to have been the worst pirate country of the 19
th century, refusing as 
it did to grant copyright protection to European authors.
39 Big multinationals of 
today, whether Unilever, Philips or the Swiss pharmaceutical industry, clearly 
benefited from pirating foreign inventions during the 19
th  century, when 
countries like the Netherlands or Switzerland did not provide for patent 
protection (Schiff 1971; Kurz 2000: 393 et seq.). Nowadays, unauthorized 
                                                 
38  This is a generally accepted view; see Weinstock, The Development Agenda; Maskus, 
Incorporating, p. 497 et seq. 
39 US Supreme Court in Golan v. Holder 565 U.S. (2012), slip op. p. 4 (»the Barbary coast of 
literature«, »buccaneers of books«). 19 
 
imitation as an effective strategy for development has been ruled out throughout 
the world.
40  
 
Finally, our third transfer – from the protection of innovation to that of traditional 
knowledge – fails to acknowledge that knowledge orders in liberal, differentiated 
societies and knowledge orders in segmented or stratified traditional societies 
operate on fundamentally different assumptions. For example, it does not make 
sense to ask who the individual author of traditional knowledge is, because the 
common feature of all types of traditional knowledge – ranging from technical 
know-how to cultural forms of expressions, signs, and genetic resources 
(Lucas-Schloetter 2008: 339 et seq.) – is an association with a cultural tradition 
as exercised by a certain community.
41 TK covers manifold factual situations: 
individual creativity resulting in individual ownership under local customary law; 
simultaneous group innovation; as well as the combination and adaptation of 
preexisting knowledge, again by individuals or groups (Brahy 2008: 296 et 
seq.). Indigenous communities furthermore reject the idea of a public domain, 
which is central to the Western IP paradigm. They claim that the use of their 
traditional knowledge has always been regulated under local norms.
42  They 
thereby refuse to have their traditional knowledge orders be reframed and re-
regulated according to Western legal principles. And indeed, sacred knowledge 
is not meant to fuel public discourse. Nor is traditional knowledge detached from 
religious and other belief systems. Nor can anyone in this realm claim to have 
uttered something »new«, which she is then entitled to own exclusively and 
transfer to anyone she likes.  
 
In spite of these differences, the discussion about traditional knowledge has 
been framed in terms of Western IP protection ever since Ulmer referred to the 
protection of folklore in Brazzaville. However, such a characterization of TK is ill 
                                                 
40 Overview and critique: Peukert, Immaterialgüterrecht und Entwicklung, forthcoming. 
41 Composite Study on Traditional Knowledge, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/5/8, para. 71(e).  
42 See WIPO Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, 
Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, The Protection of Traditional Cultural 
Expressions/Expressions of Folklore: Revised Objectives and Principles, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/9/4, 
9 January 2006, Annex, p. 40. 20 
 
conceived.
43  Only in the last couple of years have alternative, non-IP-style 
proposals gained some recognition. They suggest a defensive, customary-law 
protection for sacred and other indigenous knowledge. This approach does not 
aim at commodifying traditional knowledge, but at preserving the diverse 
cultural conditions in which this knowledge is produced. The normative basis is 
indigenous self-determination, not property (Coombe 2003 (»cultural public 
domain«); Fikentscher 2005: 3-18; Teubner/Fischer-Lescano 2008: 17 et seq.; 
Peukert 2011: 195, 220 et seq.). 
 
Taken as a whole, our story teaches another general lesson: Every transfer 
carries with it the transfers of the past, including their deficiencies. The former 
colonies not only adopted legislation that did not suit their needs. They also 
subscribed to the highly problematic assumption that intellectual property rights 
are just a special case of classical property rights. An IP-style protection of 
traditional knowledge adds yet another layer of blind spots. 
 
Thus, contrary to the assumption that legal convergence by way of transplants 
signals a movement towards more »efficient« rules (Mattei 1994: 3, 8.), the 
more formal convergence legal transfers produce, the more dysfunctionalities 
threaten to occur. The 18
th  century property analogy is still effective, but it 
brought about too many exclusive rights, a tragedy of the anticommons. The 
19
th century colonial transplant exported this problem to developing countries, 
making economic catch-up more difficult or even impossible. And the 20
th 
century analogy between IP and traditional knowledge worked only as a political 
dodge. What these transfers indicate is not a particularly just or efficient body of 
law, but one that is backed by sufficient exercise of economic and/or political 
power, be it that of publishers and other producers of creative content or 
colonial empires.  
 
                                                 
43 See Composite Study on Traditional Knowledge, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/5/8, para. 24 (»However, 
many participants in the Committee have highlighted that these conventional IP mechanisms 
may not be fully consistent or adequate for the protection of TK, given the distinctive 
characteristics of TK as subject matter for IP protection«); Munzer/Raustiala, The Uneasy Case 
for Intellectual Property Rights, p. 37. 21 
 
These conclusions have little in common with Alan Watson’s largely positive 
assessment of legal transplants (Mattei 1994: 3, 8.). The reason may be that he 
chose a very different example for his studies, namely the spread of Roman 
law. This, however, seems to be a rather peculiar model because it concerns a 
body of law that regained significance long after the original – Roman – empire 
had dissolved. I suspect that most legal transfers we observe today originate 
from existing jurisdictions. These legal orders not only exhibit persuasive 
prestige. They also represent economic and political power.  
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